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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal . 
corporation, I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 
PEGGY ALLRED, aka PEGGY 
LOVEJOY, aka THEL1\1:A 
ALLRED, 
Defendant and Appellant. I 
10752 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE HISTORY 
OF THE CASE 
A complaint was signed in the City Court on Feb-
ruary 7, 1966 charging defendant with violating sub-
section ( 8) of 32-2-1, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, Utah 1965. The Defendant was convicted by a 
jury in the City Court on April 20, 1966 and sentenced 
to $299.00 and six months jail with jail confinement 
suspended upon payment of the fine. She filed an 
1 
appeal April 20 ,1966 to the Third District Court and 
was again found guilty by a jury on October 10, 1966 
before the Honorable Merrill C. Faux and sentenced 
to six months in the County Jail and a $299.00 fine with 
five months of the jail sentence suspended upon pay-
ment of the fine. An appeal was filed October 17, 1966 
and the matter is now before the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 9 of the Utah Con-
stitution. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant in her brief argues there was no one to 
be aided by her acts. The actual facts proved were. 
Defendant, Thelma or Peggy Allred, aka Lovejoy, 
was charged under Salt Lake City Ordinance 32-2-1 
( 8) "In that said defendant, aided and abetted in the 
commission of a crime, to-wit: said defendant directed 
a Salt Lake Police Officer to a building, Room 506, 
Ben Albert Apartment, 130 South 5th East, Salt Lake 
City, to obtain sexual intercourse for hire" on Feb-
ruary 4, 1966 at approx. 8:25 p.m. 
Testimony adduced under oath was to the effect 
that Salt Lake police officer, Stanley Jorgensen, on 
January 13, 1966 ( R 39) commenced to go to the El 
Dorado Club at 170 East 2nd South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah and there investigated prostitution contacts by 
gaining the confidence of manager Mel Jones ( R L!O) . 
That the officer on January 25, 1966 observed the 
defendant in person ( R 42) ; then on January 25, 1966 
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the officer let Mel Jones know of an interest in girls 
for $30 or $40 a night and getting exactly what you 
want. He was ref erred to the redhead sitting at the bar 
(Mrs. Allred) (R 49). On February 3, 1966 l\iel Jones 
got a telephone number and called, then they waited 
and Jones dialed again while the officer memorized 
phone number 355-0529 and a conversation ensued 
(R 49 & 51). Later in the evening about 9:30 p.m. 
the phone rang and Mrs. Allred said to the officer 
'' ... the girl has gone home for the night and would 
tomorrow be all right" and gave the officer phone num-
ber 363-7373 ( R 54) (unlisted numer of Peggy Allred 
at 130 South 5th East, Apartment 203) (R 59). 
Then Peggy Allred indicated she "doesn't turn a trick 
anymore-quit in July of 1965-all I do is make the 
arrangements." (R 83). On January 4, 1966 at 8:25 
p.m. the Officer called 363-7373 and talked to Peggy 
Lovejoy, (Allred) (R 62). She advised him everything 
was set up at Room 506, Ben Albert Apartment for 
an hour for around $40 with Linda, a 24 year old 
brunette (R 63). The officer went directly to that 
address and in 506 found a known prostitute, Angie 
Colonge, aka Papasoakis (R 64, convicted 3-30-66), 
who identified herself as Linda, who let him in and 
locked the door (R 70). She was a 24 year old, five 
foot 3 inch, 120 lb. brunette (R 68). They discussed 
"this sort of thing" arranged by the other person for 
$40.00 (R 69) and a "half-and-half'', meaning half 
phallicio and half sexual intercourse (R 71), whether 
the money was to be paid now or after; to all of which 
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she made no effort to evict the officer ( R 69) . That 
a search after arrest showed the furnished apartment 
contained only a sweater, whiskey, prophylactics and 
the prostitute. The apartment was rented and paid 
for by the Lovejoys-Allreds in the name of a "Elmer 
Radecliffe," existence questionable (R 96). Thus in 
aid of a bartender and prostitute, Mrs. Lovejoy di-
rected a police officer to that room to obtain sex acts 
for hire. 
The City ordinance and its due enactment were 
stipulated to by counsel and both sides rest_ed (R 100). 
The jury returned a finding of guilty as charged. 
POINTS ON APPEAL 
Point I 
The validity of 32-2-1 revised ordinances of Salt 
Lake, City, Utah 1965 is not in issue as defendant is 
limited to the relief sought in the prayer vis: consti-
tutionality based upon clarity. 
Point II 
The appeal should be dismissed as the notice is 
defective in that it specifies the "appeal" as based on 
both the facts and the law." 
Point III 
The ordinance is clear and unambiguous thus plac-
ing persons on notice of what acts are criminal and thus 
prohibited. 
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Point IV 
32-2-1, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 
Utah 1965 is a valid exercise of the municipal police 
power in suppression of prostitution. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The Court will note at page 2 of Appellant's 
brief the relief sought is a ruling on the constitutionality 
of 32-2-1, Salt Lake City Ordinances. A constitution 
is that by which the powers of government are limited 
and to raise a "constitutional question" it must be 
shown that the statute will be unconstitutional in any 
event; hence inherently and totally invalid by reason of 
lack of clarity, depriving of property without due 
process, or otherwise infringing rights enumerated in 
the bill of rights of the Federal Constitution. 
It would appear then, that appellant does not ask 
the court to rule on the other ground whereby this case 
might reach the Supreme Court; that is, validity. Val-
idity is defined by words and phrases as referring to 
the power to enact the particular statute, and not merely 
to its judicial construction or application. Boehringer 
vs. Y arna County, 140 P. 507 ( p 12 Volume 44) 
"Y alid", is defined as meaning to "test the validity of, 
to make valid, confirm, good or sufficient in point of 
law, efficacious, executed with the proper formalities, 
. " citing Thompson vs. Town of Frostproof, 103 
S. 118, 89 Fla. 92. 
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By failing to request a ruling on the power of the 
Salt Lake City Commission to enact the ordinance 
the Court can rule that appellant has narrowed the 
issue before the Court by default in pleading and thus 
consider only Point II argued by appellant. 
Point II 
Another procedural error on appeal is to be found 
in the NOTICE OF APPEAL wherein appellant 
asserts the "appeal is based on both the facts and the 
Law". 
This appeal is purportedly taken, pursuant to 
Article VIII section 9 of the Utah Constitution: 
"Section 9. (Appeals from district court -
From justices' courts.) From all final judg-
ments of the district courts, there shall be a right 
of appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal 
shall be upon the record made in the court below 
and under such regulations as may be provided 
by law. In equity cases the appeal may be on 
questions of both law and fact; in cases at law 
the appeal shall be on questions of law alone. 
Appeals shall also lie from the final orders and 
decrees of the Court in the administration of 
decedent estates, and in cases of guardianship, 
as shall be provided by law. Appeals shall also 
lie from the final judgment of justices of the 
peace in civil and criminal cases to the District 
Courts on both questions of law and fact, with 
such limitations and restrictions as shall be pro-
vided bv law; and the decision of the District 
Courts ~n such appeals shall be final, except in 
cases involving the validity of constitutionality 
of a statute. 
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This Court has repeatedly upheld that prov1s10n 
by ruling that the decision of the District Court is final 
on the facts and the Law. Most recently in Salt Lake 
City v. Frank Graniere #9911 and in State v. Lyte, 
75 Utah 283, 284 P 1006 and in Salt Lake City v. 
Perkins, 122 Utah 43, 245 P2d 1176. 
Thus appellant in her notice fails to state grounds 
for consideration of the case by the Supreme Court 
and the appeal should be dismissed on procedural 
grounds. 
Point III 
Appellant argues that 32-2-1 (7-8) is so vague and 
ambiguous as to be unconstitutional and as authority 
therefor cites an 1950 polygamous prosecution ,State 
"·Musser, 223 P 2d 193, wherein defendant was charged 
under section 103-11-1 U.C.A. 1943, making it a crimi-
nal offense for two or more persons to conspire " ( 5) 
to commit any act injurious ... to public morals ... " 
In that case no language nor historic fact nor other 
law nor surrounding circumstance connected with the 
enactment, showed any intent to limit the words "pub-
lic morals" to other than face meaning so the statute 
was held vague and uncertain under the 14th Amend-
ment. It was claimed then that the statute failed to speci-
fy acts such as teaching polygamous doctrine so the 
statute was changed and prosecution renewed on the 
basis of an act declared to be unlawful. 
We are not so unmindful of public rights of pro-
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tection that we allow known criminal plans, to rob, 
destroy or kill, to be carried out in full before the weight 
of the law can be applied. Just so the city ordinance 
in question does not require the complainant to commit 
an act of adultery, fornication or prostitution before 
the pernicious practice of peddling human flesh can 
be suppressed by application of legal process. The ordi-
nance declares the act, of agreeing or offering to com-
mit an act of sexual intercourse for hire, unlawful 
and further that aiding or abetting such act by direct-
ing any person to any place for such act of sexual inter-
course is also unlawful. That is what was charged and 
proved and the words are clear and understandable 
to even the most illiterate. Sexual intercourse is subject 
to historical, medical and practical interpretation and 
may be found in any dictionary. Aiding and abetting 
are synonomous terms defined in Webster's New Col-
legiate Dictionary as "To help; to further ... one 
who or that which promotes or helps in something done; 
... " What could be of more help to a prostitute than 
to rent a room for her use and direct men to that place. 
What could be of more help to a bartender in providing 
female companionship for his customers than the facts 
proved and do not those acts of renting the room in a 
false name and using unlisted phone numbers and 
subterfuge in returning calls indicate a guilty mind 
and actual knowledge that the acts done were unlawful? 
To argue that acts such as lewd, meretricious display 
and of moral perversion are vague, ignores the test of 
whether the words are defined in law, by historic fact,· 
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or in daily usage. Lewd is defined in 76-39-5 with lasci-
vious or obscene and exposure of person or private 
parts openly or in public or indecently or with any 
person married or not and in Webster's as "lay, ignor-
ant, vile . . . wicked, worthless; base 2 . . . Lustful, 
lascivious; unchaste." All pointing to base sexual lust 
and clear of understanding as stated in this court in 
the case of Ogden City vs. McLaughlin (1888) 5 Utah 
387, 16 p. 721, wherein a man and woman on a com-
plaint before a Justice of the Peace demurred that 
"resorting to a house of ill fame for lewdness . . . " 
do not state facts constituting a public offense. In so 
deciding the court found the city has power to "restrain 
and punish ... prostitutes". The facts charged 
failed to show either was a prostitute or panderer. The 
court said in effect the Ogden Charter § 35 gives power 
over prostitutes but does not embrace the offense of 
lewdness unless "it be the lewdness of prostitutes" ... 
"It does not authorize the restraining of prostitution, 
except it be by restraining in some way the prostitutes" 
... or "keepers of bawdy and other disorderly houses 
§ 9. Compiled Laws 697 was designed to break up 
houses of ill fame and punish the keepers thereof but 
that man and woman weren't claimed to be keepers 
in contradistinction to what has been alleged and proved 
in the instant case. 
The term meretricious display is defined in Web-
ster's is I. Of, pertaining to, characteristic of, or being 
a prostitute. 2. Alluring by false show; gaudily and 
deceitfully ornamental. Moral perversion is defined as 
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"a maladjustment of the sexual life, such that satis-
faction is sought in aberrant ways that is exceptional; 
abnormal. 
In support of the proposition that the words of Salt 
Lake Ordinance 32-2-1 (7 & 8) are clear and un-
ambiguous, I will cite a few more indefinite expressions 
which have been upheld. In re Hubbard (1964) 62 
A.C. 116, 396 P2d 809, an ordinance prohibiting par-
ticipation in any "game of chance" was held not void 
for uncertainty as a person of common and ordinary 
intelligence can distinguish, see also: U.S. vs. Petrillo, 
332 U.S. 1. Also upheld are "dissolute" and "immoral", 
People v. Deibert, 256 P 2d 355; "to make diligent 
effort to find the owner"; "unreasonable speed"; "un-
justifiable physical pain or mental suffering"; and "to 
the annoyance of any other person". Lorenson v. Su-
perior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 49, 216 P 2d 859; "satisfac-
tory" Moyant v. Porames, 30 N.J. 528, 154 A 2d 9 
(1959), "good", Brielle vs. Zeigler, 73 N.J. Super 
352, 179 A 2d 789 (1962); "public peace", Bohler v. 
Lane, 204 F Supp 168; "obscene matter", City of Cin-
cinnati v. Coy, 182 N E 2d 628; "necessary food", Peo-
ple v. Yates (1931), 298 P 961, 114 Cal. App. (Supp) 
782. 
Thus it is sufficient, to comply with the legisla-
tive requirement of due process of law, if the crime 
be set out in words well enough known to enable those 
persons within its reach to understand and correctly 
apply them. State ex rel Cox v. Bd. of Education, 21 
Utah 401, 60 P. 1013. 
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Point IV 
Section 5 Constitution of Utah provides for mu-
nicipal corporations to be created by general laws on 
a population basis by charter: 
"Each city forming its charter under this sec-
tion shall have, and is hereby granted, the au-
thority to exercise all powers relating to munici-
pal affairs, and to adopt and enforce within its 
limits, local police, sanitary and similar regula-
tions not in conflict with the general law, and no 
enumeration of powers in this constitution or 
any law shall be deemed to limit or restrict the 
general grant of authority hereby conferred; ,, 
The power and authority of municipalities in this 
state to enact ordinances is derived from the legislature·, 
S.L.C. vs. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234 (see 15-8-
50 UCA 1943). 
The legislature has further authorized the cities 
to control those acts as enumerated in UCA 10-8. Some 
of these have already been mentioned in appellant's 
brief. We call the court's attention to UCA 10-8-50, 
which provides that the "city may punish ... indecent 
or disorderly conduct, or lewd or lascivious behavior 
... and such other petty offenses as the board or com-
mission or city council may deem proper." 
The legislature obviously realizes that they cannot 
give explicit authorization in every field of human con-
duct where control would be desirable. They have 
therefore in UCA 10-8-50 given the city authority to 
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control those acts generally considered to be misde-
meanors which the commission or council in their wisdom 
may see fit. 
Appellant further contends that the city has not 
the power to make the act of "offering" a misdemeanor 
and cites cases concerning "mere agreement to commit 
a burglary, the mere agreement to commit larceny, the 
mere agreement to commit forgery, etc." We submit 
that there is a distinction to be drawn. One person 
alone can commit burglary, larceny or forgery. One 
person alone cannot commit the crime of prostitution 
or sex acts for hire, "it takes two to tango". There 
must be an agreement either expressed or implied be-
tween two or more individuals before the act can ever 
take place. If the city desires to prevent the act, then 
the logical place to start is to prevent the initial agree-
ment. 
If this Court finds that, contrary to appellant's 
brief, a sex act for hire is a crime under the City Ordi-
nances, then under the authority of UCA 10-8-84 the 
City has the power to prevent that agreement which is 
necessary to perpetrate the crime. 
A municipal ordinance is presumed valid and should 
be sustained when it bears a reasonable relationship to 
the safeguarding of public health, safety and morals 
... a city has a duty to use every legitimate means to 
assure public peace and tranquility, and the constitu-
tional rights of citizens to use skating rinks on an equal 
basis has been held not to encompass a right to cause 
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a disturbance. Mister Softee v. Mayor and Council 
of City of Hoboken, 186 A 2d 513. This court has 
state in the case of Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Dorke 
et al, 50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241, 242, " ... to challenge 
the constitutionality of a solemn and deliberate act of 
legislation by the lawmaking power of a sovereign 
state always presents a serious question, however trifling 
or insignificant may be the amount involved in the par-
ticular case." In McQuillin on Municipal Corp., 3rd 
Edition V 1 pg. 513, the author states a legislature 
may create a "miniature state within its locality" and 
further the municipal corporation serves to assist in 
the government of the state § 2.09 and to promote 
public welfare generally by exercising powers of the 
s~ate. Poulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30, and U.S. v. 
Baltimore Railroad, 17 Wall (U.S.) 322. 
When appellant says the ordinance must be con-
strued against the city according to 1 Dillon on Mu-
nicipal Corporations (5th Ed.) § 237, she fails to state 
that such construction is in those cases where the state 
law is contrary to city ordinances. That Dillon in 
section 239 ( 91) says strict construction does not apply 
to the "mode adopted by the municipality to carry into 
effect powers expressly or plainly granted ... " where 
not limited or prescribed by the legislature. The usual 
test being reasonableness. § 238 provides "they may 
exercise all the powers within the fair intent and pur-
pose of their creation which are reasonably proper to 
give effect to powers expressly granted and § 239 you 
are to determine in favor of the state where city con-
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struction IS ambiguous but the first rule is the con-
struction IS to be just and give the ordinance "fair 
effect". 
As authority for strict construction and vagueness, 
appellant cites City of Price v. Jaynes, 191 P2d 606. 
In that case Price enacted an ordinance to secure the 
right of persons not to be subjected to unreasonable 
searches and seizures which offense was held laudable 
but too vague. To avoid this decision the ordinance 
must set out the act or acts prohibited and must spell 
out what is under various situations an unlawful search 
or seizure, as 32-2-1 does. Justice Wade concurring on 
P. 611 said "a city may enact greater offenses (than 
petty) where the legislature expressly grants it such 
power" see Bohr v. Salt Lake, 79 Utah 121, 8 P2d 591, 
and American Fork v. Charliere, 43 Utah 231, 134 P 
739, American Fork v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 
P 249, and American Fork v. Briggs, 43 Utah 252, 134 
P. 747. Appellant also cites Ogden City vs. McLaughlin 
et al, 188, 5 Utah 387, 16 P 721, which can be distin-
guished as those facts failed to show prostitution being 
involved as it is in the instant case. Appellant's reliance 
on page 12 of Salt Lake City v. Sutter ( 1923) 216 
P. 234, fails to take cognizance of the fact that 
the state in that case had extensive rules on liquor and 
had only authorized the city to "license and regulate, 
or prohibit the manufacturing, selling, giving away 
or disposition . . . of liquors" and to "prevent intoxi-
cation, fighting, etc." That defendant was charged 
with knowingly ha Ying liquor in his possession (a return 
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to prohibition) and the court held against the city, 
there being a direct conflict of laws. For a contrary 
result see Zamata v. Browning, 51 Utah 400, 170 P 
1057, wherein an ordinance prohibiting the sale of 
liquor was upheld as it supported the existing state 
law. Appellant also relies on City of Ogden v. Bear 
Lake & River Water Works & Irrigation Co., 52 
P967. To distinguish that case the court need only 
note that Ogden sold its water system, which was 
"dedicated to a public use", to Bothwell who let in-
terests go to Bear Lake then Ogden deeming public 
interest in jeopardy brought action to recover the 
system and have a receiver appointed. The case was 
remanded for trial as the charter authorized Ogden 
to "purchase, receive, hold, sell, lease, convey, and 
dispose of property, real and personal for the benefit 
of the City." And the court felt the city officials must 
protect city interests and acted beyond their authority 
in making a patently bad deal. 
The Respondent, Salt Lake City, is asking that 
this court recognize a triportite division of all legis-
lative subject matter: I. affairs exclusively of muni-
cipal concern, 2. affairs exclusively of state concern 
and 3. affairs of both municipal and state concern. 
Under this division where both are concerned both 
should have concurrent legislative power and the local 
regulation be held valid unless it conflicts with state 
law. This court has already so held in Salt Lake City 
v. Towne House Athletic Club and University Club, 
#10640, dated February 27, 1967, wherein a general 
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grant under UCA 10-8-39 to license and regulate was 
held not preempted by a later specific grant not in-
cluded in the general (Also American Fork v. Char-
liere, supra). A line of cases in Ohio headed by City 
of Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N E 
114 (1917) upheld an ordinance identical to the state 
statute establishing speed limits and prohibiting mu-
nicipalities from enacting them as the result did not 
frustrate the policy expressed by the state. The Utah 
policy of suppression of prostitution, bawdy houses, 
lewd acts, adultery and related sex acts is clear and 
should be given effect by recognition of ordinances 
drafted to carry out that expressed intention by pro-
hibiting prositution of one's self or another to one indi-
vidual. In re Hubbard (Supra 1964) ; the ordinance 
prohibited participation in any "game of chance". 
California has extensive gambling statutes but the 
ordinance was upheld because it did not operate in a 
field occupied by state legislation; it did not conflict 
with general law and was a valid exercise of a "muni-
cipal officer". The court said: 
"Since the general laws do not make illegal 
all forms of gambling, or even all forms of gam-
ing they cannot be said to occupy either field to 
the exclusion of the exercise of local police power, 
unless we adopt the negative type of argument 
inherent in defendants contention, that is,that by 
making specific acts illegal the Legislature in-
tended all other acts of similar character to be 
of such innocent character that no local authority 
might adopt a contrary view .... "Accord, Prival 
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v. :Mooney (1964) 62 A.C. 126, 396 P2d 815, 
41 Cal. Rptr. 399. 
Inherent in this division then are the tests that a 
matter is the state's when 1. State laws are so com-
prehensive as to show an intent to preempt or, 2. They 
express an intent to preempt or, 3. The subject is par-
tially covered by state law and the effect on transient 
citizens outweighs the possible benefits to the munici-
pality. None of these tests would seem to apply in 
the instant case against Mrs. Lovejoy. 
The first category in which the affair is exclu-
sively of municipal concern can be determined from 
cases already decided, such as zoning. See William 
E. Naylor v. Salt Lake City, #10373, filed February 
9, 1966, wherein this court said a city commis~ion 
charging with the duty of zoning "must necessarily 
be allowed a wide latitude of discretion as to the manner 
in which they can best be attained. In conformity with 
well-established rules relating to the powers of admin-
istrative bodies, it is to be assumed that they have some 
specialized knowledge of the conditions and the needs 
upon which the discharge of their duties depends . . . 
the court will not invade the province of the commission 
and substitute its judgment therefore . . . " See also 
Village of West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d 
113, 205 N E 2d 382 (1965). Defendant was convicted 
of soliciting door to door contrary to ordinance. That 
finding was reversed, the appeal's court holding that 
the state statutes did not undertake affirmatively to 
regulate peddling but merely purported to limit the 
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power of municipalities to do so. They interpret general 
laws so that municipal autonomy is attained and a 
statute would not be permitted to supersede a conflict-
ing ordianance unless the subject matter was of state-
wide concern. Also ~lcElvoy v. City of Akron, 173 
Ohio St. 189, 181 N E 2nd 26 (1962); Froelick v. 
City of Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N E 212 ( 1919). 
In another case, the City of Youngstown v. Evans, 
168 N E 844 (1929), the court upheld an ordinance 
which prescribed penalites in excess of those permitted 
by a statute which purported to establish maximums. 
They reasoned the statute was not a "general law" 
because it was a limitation of municipal lawmaking 
rather than a "rule of conduct." If limited curbs upon 
local legislative authority were allowed t~re would be 
no principle by which to draw a line and invalidate 
an act prohibiting all municipal regulation. 
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CONCLUSION 
If the court looks past the procedural defects of 
the appeal, it may establish criteria upholding ordi-
nances where reasonable, as in this case, and thus pre-
vent a ploy used by the defense in arguing that where 
no state crime is enumerated the city is without 
authority and where there is a state crime the state 
! has preempted the field. 
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